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NexGen Space LLC ?? Page 1 Evolvable Lunar Architecture Economic Assessment and Systems Analysis of an Evolvable Lunar Architecture that Leverages Commercial Space Capabilities and Public-Private-Partnerships
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This study by NexGen Space LLC (NexGen) was partly funded by a grant from NASAs Emerging Space office in the Office of the Chief Technologist. The conclusions in this report are solely those of NexGen and the study team authors.
Date of Publication
July 13, 2015
Study Team
Charles Miller, NexGen Space LLC, Principal Investigator Alan Wilhite, Wilhite Consulting, Inc., Co-Principal Investigator Dave Cheuvront Rob Kelso Howard McCurdy, American University Edgar Zapata, NASA KSC
Independent Review Team
Joe Rothenberg, former NASA Associate Administrator for Spaceflight (Chairman) Gene Grush, former NASA JSC Engineering Directorate (Technical subsection lead) Jeffrey Hoffman, MIT Professor, former NASA astronaut (S&MA subsection lead) David Leestma, former NASA astronaut, (Cost Estimation subsection lead) Hoyt Davidson, Near Earth LLC, (Business Risk Management subsection lead) Alexandra Hall, Sodor Space, (Public Benefits subsection lead) Jim Ball, Spaceport Strategies LLC Frank DiBello, Space Florida Jeff Greason, XCOR Aerospace Ed Horowitz, US Space LLC Steve Isakowitz, former NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Exploration Christopher Kraft, former Director NASA Johnson Space Center Michael Lopez-Alegria, former NASA astronaut Thomas Moser, former NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Human Spaceflight James Muncy, Polispace Gary Payton, former NASA astronaut, former Deputy Undersecretary for Space, USAF Eric Sterner, former NASA Associate Deputy Administrator for Policy and Planning Will Trafton, former NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Spaceflight James Vedda, Aerospace Corporation Robert Walker, former Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Technology Gordon Woodcock, consultant
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NexGen Space LLC ?? Page 2 Evolvable Lunar Architecture Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... 4 STUDY ASSUMPTIONS .................................................................................................. 6 1) PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS ACQUISITION STRATEGY ...................................... 6 2) 100% PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LUNAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS ....................... 8 3) INTERNATIONAL LUNAR AUTHORITY TO REDUCE BUSINESS RISK ............................... 9 4) EVOLVABLE LUNAR ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................ 9 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 11 GENERAL TECHNICAL APPROACH .................................................................................. 11 ANALYSIS METHODS ...................................................................................................... 12 PHASE 1A ROBOTIC SCOUTING, PROSPECTING, SITE PREPARATION .......................... 13 PHASE 1B HUMAN SORTIES TO LUNAR EQUATOR ..................................................... 19 PHASE 2 HUMAN SORTIES TO POLES .......................................................................... 23 PHASE 3 PROPELLANT DELIVERY TO L2 & PERMANENT LUNAR BASE ...................... 25 PHASE 4+ (OPTIONAL) REUSABLE OTV BETWEEN LEO AND L2 ............................... 27 TECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................... 28 LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATES ............................................................................... 30 BASIS OF ESTIMATE ........................................................................................................ 30 Ground Rules ............................................................................................................. 30 Assumptions ............................................................................................................... 31 HISTORICAL DATA .......................................................................................................... 32 MODELING & ANALYSIS - SCOPE ................................................................................... 34 Modeling & Analysis Drivers ................................................................................. 35 Modeling & Analysis Context, the NASA Budget ................................................... 35 LIFE CYCLE COST ASSESSMENT - RESULTS .................................................................... 37 Frequently Asked Questions ...................................................................................... 45 Life Cycle Cost Assessment Results Summary ........................................................ 46 Life Cycle Cost Assessment Forward Work ........................................................... 46 MANAGING INTEGRATED RISKS ........................................................................... 48 RISK STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE LOSS OF LAUNCH VEHICLE .......................................... 50 RISK STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE LOSS OF IN-SPACE ELEMENTS ..................................... 54 RISK STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE LOSS OF LUNAR LANDER OR ASCENT VEHICLES ......... 56 RISK STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE LOSS OF SURFACE ELEMENTS ...................................... 57 RISK STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING LOSS OF CREW OR LOSS OF MISSION ...................... 58 RISK STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING CREW HEALTH AND MEDICAL CONDITIONS ........... 59 CONCLUSIONS FOR INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT ................................................... 60 MITIGATING BUSINESS RISKS ................................................................................ 63 WEAKNESSES OF PPP MODEL ........................................................................................ 63 MITIGATING BUSINESS RISK WITH AN INTERNATIONAL LUNAR AUTHORITY ................. 64 GOVERNANCE CASE STUDIES ............................................................................... 67 Port Authority of NY-NJ ............................................................................................ 67 CERN ......................................................................................................................... 70 Tennessee Valley Authority ....................................................................................... 72 COMSAT-INTELSAT ................................................................................................. 74
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NexGen Space LLC ?? Page 3 Evolvable Lunar Architecture AT&T (Monopoly, Regulated Utility) ........................................................................ 77 Boeing-United Airlines Monopoly ............................................................................. 78 National Parks & Private Tourism ............................................................................ 79 McMurdo Station (Antarctica) .................................................................................. 80 Open Architectures Increasing Private Investment & Accelerating Innovation .. 83 CASE STUDY FIGURES OF MERIT (FOMS) & SUMMARY AOA ........................................ 86 PROS OF INTERNATIONAL LUNAR AUTHORITY ............................................................... 87 CONS OF INTERNATIONAL LUNAR AUTHORITY .............................................................. 88 PUBLIC BENEFITS ....................................................................................................... 89 ECONOMIC GROWTH ...................................................................................................... 89 NATIONAL SECURITY ..................................................................................................... 89 DIPLOMATIC SOFT POWER .............................................................................................. 89 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION .................................................................................... 90 SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES ................................................................................................... 92 STEM EDUCATION AND INSPIRATION ............................................................................ 92 SUSTAINING AND MAXIMIZING THE PUBLIC BENEFITS ................................................... 93 APPENDIX A STUDY TEAM BIOGRAPHIES ..................................................... 94 APPENDIX B INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM BIOS ...................................... 97 END NOTES .................................................................................................................. 100
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture Executive Summary This studys primary purpose was to assess the feasibility of new approaches for achieving our national goals in space. NexGen assembled a team of former NASA executives and engineers who assessed the economic and technical viability of an Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA) that leverages commercial capabilities and services that are existing or likely to emerge in the near-term. We evaluated an ELA concept that was designed as an incremental, low-cost and low-risk method for returning humans to the Moon in a manner that directly supports NASAs long-term plan to send humans to Mars. The ELA strategic objective is commercial mining of propellant from lunar poles where it will be transported to lunar orbit to be used by NASA to send humans to Mars. The study assumed A) that the United States is willing to lead an international partnership of countries that leverages private industry capabilities, and B) public-private-partnership models proven in recent years by NASA and other government agencies. Based on these assumptions, the our analysis concludes that: Based on the experience of recent NASA program innovations, such as the COTS program, a human return to the Moon may not be as expensive as previously thought. America could lead a return of humans to the surface of the Moon within a period of 5-7 years from authority to proceed at an estimated total cost of about $10 Billion (+/- 30%) for two independent and competing commercial service providers, or about $5 Billion for each provider, using partnership methods. America could lead the development of a permanent industrial base on the Moon of 4 private-sector astronauts in about 10-12 years after setting foot on the Moon that could provide 200 MT of propellant per year in lunar orbit for NASA for a total cost of about $40 Billion (+/- 30%). Assuming NASA receives a flat budget, these results could potentially be achieved within NASAs existing deep space human spaceflight budget. A commercial lunar base providing propellant in lunar orbit might substantially reduce the cost and risk NASA of sending humans to Mars. The ELA would reduce the number of required Space Launch System (SLS) launches from as many as 12 to a total of only 3, thereby reducing SLS operational risks, and increasing its affordability. An International Lunar Authority, modeled after CERN and traditional public infrastructure authorities, may be the most advantageous mechanism for managing the combined business and technical risks associated with affordable and sustainable lunar development and operations. A permanent commercial lunar base might substantially pay for its operations by exporting propellant to lunar orbit for sale to NASA and others to send humans to Mars, thus enabling the economic development of the Moon at a small marginal cost.
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture To the extent that national decision-makers value the possibility of economical production of propellant at the lunar poles, it needs to be a priority to send robotic prospectors to the lunar poles to confirm that water (or hydrogen) is economically accessible near the surface inside the lunar craters at the poles. The public benefits of building an affordable commercial industrial base on the Moon include economic growth, national security, advances in select areas of technology and innovation, public inspiration, and a message to the world about American leadership and the long-term future of democracy and free markets.
An independent review team led by Mr. Joe Rothenberg, former head of NASA human spaceflight and composed of former NASA executives, former NASA astronauts, commercial space executives, and space policy experts reviewed our analysis and concluded that Given the study scope, schedule and funding we believe the team has done an excellent job in developing a conceptual architecture that will provide a starting point for trade studies to evaluate the architectural and design choices.
DISCLAIMER: This was a limited study that evaluated two specific technical approaches for one architectural strategy that leverages commercial partnerships to return to the Moon. We did not evaluate all alternatives for returning to the Moon, nor did we evaluate using similar partnership methods for alternative destinations or purposes. While funded by NASA, the conclusions in this study are solely those of the NexGen study team authors. ?? ?? ?? ??
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture STUDY ASSUMPTIONS The primary economic research question of this study was:
Could America return humans to the Moon, and ultimately develop a permanent human settlement on the Moon, by leveraging commercial partnerships, within NASAs existing deep space human spaceflight budget of $3-4 billion per year?
The key study assumptions for this analysis included: 1) Public Private Partnerships as Acquisition Strategy
A significant purpose of this study is to assess the utility of public-private partnerships specifically the proven Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)/ ISS Cargo Resupply Service (CRS) model for private-sector lunar development. These approaches have now been proven to be effective at significantly reducing costs. While the focus of this study was on returning humans to the Moon, these same methods could be used for alternative destinations. In the last decade, NASA has transitioned from a government-owned and operated cargo delivery system to the International Space Station (ISS) to a privately-owned and operated cargo delivery system with multiple competitors. NASA achieved this major transition by creating a public-private-partnership. Instead of a traditional acquisition approach, NASA used a linked two-part acquisition strategy summarized as follows: 1. NASA first signed funded Space Act Agreements (fSAAs) with significant investments by both NASA and industry, to demonstrate new system level capabilities that did not exist before. This program was called COTS. 2. The NASA CRS program, used FAR part 12, commercial terms, firm-fixed price (FFP) contracts to acquire cargo delivery services after the partners had proven they had the capability in COTS.
The result was successful development of two brand new launch vehicles (SpaceXs Falcon 9 and Orbitals Antares), two new American ISS cargo delivery spacecraft (Dragon and Cygnus) at costs much less than was possible using traditional acquisition approaches. These two acquisition tools the fSAAs and the FFP FAR part 12 (commercial terms) contracts were critically linked. In this specific situation, each element worked together to achieve all of NASAs objectives. Further, NASA analysis demonstrates that the fSAAs saved NASA many billions of dollars as compared to traditional NASA development approaches. These successes have helped NASA quickly replace critical functions previously provided by the Space Shuttle at a time of significant budget constraints.
Cost Savings from the COTS/CRS Acquisition Model In 2010, NASA conducted a studyi that compared SpaceXs actual costs to develop the Falcon 9 and Dragon spacecraft against what NASAs cost models predicted it would
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture cost using traditional cost-plus methods under federal acquisition regulations (FAR). Using the NASA-AF Cost Model (NAFCOM), NASA estimated that it would have cost NASA $3.977 Billion to develop these systems using traditional contracting methods. The reported SpaceX cost was $443 millionii, which would be an 89% (or 8-to-1) reduction in costs over NASAs estimated cost for the traditional approach.
Policy History of COTS/CRS The CRS program was created in the aftermath of the Columbia Accident by the Bush (43) Administration as the Commercial Crew/Cargo Program. However, COTS was created later, in 2005, by NASA Administrator Mike Griffin. Griffin decided to use NASAs other transactions authority (OTA) to fund development of commercial systems in a much more streamlined manner. Griffin explainediii his thinking about this innovative strategy to the NASA JSC Oral History project:
The question was how to get that started. In my view, a good way to get that started would be to make available to successful commercial developers the government market, and even to provide them a little bit of seed money.
Using the In-Q-Tel model, one could achieve valid public purposes with a little bit of public money, while not corrupting the market.
The way we structured it, according to what I had in mind, was through Space Act Agreements which themselves would be competed for.
The idea was that we would make available milestone payments to companies who were working on their own private goals to develop space transportation systems. If they met milestones of interest to usand we published what those milestones were then they would get payments.
We would not be involved in reviewing the designs or the development practices of the companies involved. They would have to bring the products to market in their own way, in their own time, by their own means, according to their own standards.
I think everybody knew that the industry had reached a maturation point where the technical and managerial skills to develop commercial spaceflight capabilities were out there, and that what was lacking was any form of market. No matter how you cut it, the initial market was going to have to be government. Then once you got over those barriers to entry, maybe other purely commercial markets could develop. No one knew what those were, and I dont know what those are today. But you would never have an opportunity to find out if you couldnt get over the initial barriers to entry, and government could help with that.
Four Successes in a Row for COTS/CRS Model What we call the COTS model which uses the U.S. Governments other transactions authority (OTA) via funded Space Act Agreements has now developed four (4) new American launch vehicles in a row, when you account for the Atlas V and
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture Delta IV. These launchers were developed using nearly identical commercial partnership methods. The Atlas V and Delta IV were developed by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, respectively, with commercial methods and processes, large private investments, and a significant (but minority) government investment. The U.S. Department of Defense invested $500 million in each project using OTAs as true partners, with Lockheed and Boeing privately investing several billion dollars each. Since each firm invested significant amounts of capital, for which they would only earn a return if it succeeded and flew successfully and often, the interests of the partners were aligned. The U.S. Department of Defense was willing to accept a secondary role with insight, but minimal USG oversight and control during the development phaseiv. Both of these new launch vehicles were developed in about four (4) years, which was the same amount of time required to develop the Falcon 9 and Antares launch vehicles. All of these launch systems succeeded on their first try.
SpaceHab Independently Validates COTS/CRS Model NASA has used similar public private partnership methods in the past that resulted in great success, as well as savings to the American taxpayer. SpaceHab was a commercial microgravity firm that raised private venture financing to commercially develop its patented pressurized mid-deck Shuttle modules. Of that amount, about $150 million was spent on DDT&E and manufacturing two flight modulesv. This private financing was substantially based on a contract to sell commercial mid-deck locker services to NASA, and augmented by the potential of other commercial markets. The U.S. Congress mandated that NASA conduct an independent cost assessment of what it would take NASA to develop the SpaceHab system using traditional government procurement practices. Price Waterhouse worked with MSFC and used MSFCs standard cost model tool to estimatevi that it would have cost NASA $1.2 Billion, which was 8 times more than SpaceHab spent using commercial practices and methods. SpaceHab demonstrated the same nearly order of magnitude cost savings that SpaceX demonstrated almost two decades later.
Implications for Cost Assessment The NexGen study team had access to the data described above, as well as significant additional technical and cost information from many other space projects during the conduct of this study. This is discussed in much greater detail in the section on Life Cycle Cost Estimation starting on page 30. 2) 100% Private Ownership of Lunar Infrastructure and Assets
We assume private ownership of lunar infrastructure and systems. We did not identify any requirement for USG ownership of any of the lunar infrastructure elements. Private ownership and responsibility for infrastructure is critical to driving market-based incentives, decision-making, and efficiencies. NASA can achieve its public purposes and meet NASAs needs by serving as customer of commercially-provided services. NASA has stated that "We're going to spend a 10-year period of time between 2020 to 2030 in cis-lunar space, trying to establish an infrastructure in lunar orbit from which we can help entrepreneurs, international partners and the like who want to get down to
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture the surface of the moon."vii This architecture assumes as a baseline that NASA will not lead a return to the Moon, as stated by current NASA leadership, although it may support entrepreneurial lunar surface activities in pursuit of its journey to Mars. This study investigates one particular approach, and implementation of, such NASA support. 3) International Lunar Authority to Reduce Business Risk
There are significant implications of the private ownership of assets, as it transfers the majority of the development risk to private industry. The cost and risk of developing a lunar base even with NASA and other countrys space agencies as anchor tenant customers is far beyond that which conventional requirements for risk-adjusted return on investment will accept or allow. The combination of very large financial commitments, technical risk, and dependence of governments keeping their commitments, makes this an extra-ordinary risk. More important than anything, industry must be convinced that NASA and other space agencies will honor and keep their long-term commitments for lunar-based services. It is imperative that the U.S. Government not change its mind and break its commitment 2, 4 or 8 years later when we get a change of Congress or a change in President and NASA Administrator. However, given recent history, it is difficult to imagine industry trusting that NASA can keep such a commitment without significant changes. Effectively managing this risk is a critical priority for the success of this model. In the section on Managing Business Risk, starting on page 63, we will provide analysis on various alternatives to mitigate this risk. Our recommended solution based on the analysis of alternatives is the creation of an International Lunar Authority that is modeled after a combination of CERN and traditional public infrastructure authorities used in airports and seaports around the world. 4) Evolvable Lunar Architecture
The evolvable lunar architecture, which leverages commercial partnerships, that was assessed by NexGen was a 3-phase, step-by-step development of a lunar base. To the maximum extent possible, it uses existing and proven technologies in the current phase of development, and in parallel developed key technologies necessary for the next phase. The key decision point for transitioning to the next phase was driven, in part, by a few key technology developments. This step-by-step approach allows for the incremental development and insertion of reusable elements in a low-risk phased manner that minimizes cost and risk. This was a critical aspect of the ELA, which will be covered in more detail in which is discussed at length in a section focused on our strategy to mitigate technical risk starting on page 48. There were three phases to the NexGen Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA):
Phase 1: Human Sorties to the Equator/Robotic Scouting of Poles
Phase 1 was designed with three independent activities taking place in parallel: The robotic segment would focus on characterizing the amount and nature of the
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture water in the lunar poles, to enable later prospecting, and to identify the optimal site for a lunar base. The human transportation segment would focus on developing and demonstrating the key systems for returning humans to the Moon, including the in-space transportation (a reusable crew capsule for transporting humans to lunar orbit and returning them safely to Earth), and a lunar lander. The technology segment would develop the technologies needed in Phase 2, such as propellant storage and transfer.
The Key Decision Point (KDP) to begin Phase 2 is the successful demonstration of human landing at the equator and with the successful demonstration of propellant storage and transfer capability needed for transferring human systems to a lunar polar orbit in Phase 2.
Phase 2: Sorties at Poles & ISRU Capability Development
The focus of Phase 2 is human sorties at the lunar poles, and developing the key capabilities and technologies needed for Phase 3. This is a stepwise transition phase that includes: Development of lunar surface ISRU capabilities and technologies to mine the lunar ice, and convert the water into propellant Development of a large reusable LOX-H2 lunar lander, including reliable cryogenic LOX/H2 engines and propellant depots. Completion of the robotic scouting mission, and selection of the site for the permanent lunar mining base.
The KDP for Phase 3 is when lunar water ISRU, cryogenic LOX/H2 storage and transfer, and a large reusable lunar lander are all available. The reusable lunar lander will have the ability to transport propellant to the L2 depot and return, to transport large structures from lunar orbit to the lunar surface, and safely transport humans to/from the lunar surface.
Phase 3: Permanent Lunar Base transporting propellant to L2
The focus of Phase 3 is the operations of a large-scale mining lunar water, cracking of the water into lunar propellant, storage of the propellant, and transfer of 200 metric tons of propellant per year to a propellant depot at the Earth-Moon L2 station. To achieve this objective, a permanent lunar base for a crew of 4 is first developed using the lunar ISRU and reusable lunar lander. The purpose of the crew is to operate, maintain, and repair the mostly automated ISRU equipment.
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture Technical Analysis General Technical Approach For the three-phase Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA), space transportation systems and supporting infrastructure were designed and analyzed from initially providing access to the lunar surface to the development of a permanent human outpost supporting the production of lunar resource propellant for deep space exploration (Figure T-1). Phase 1 includes robotic prospecting for lunar ice at the poles to determine if exploitable ice does exist and human lunar equatorial surface access for demonstrating key space transportation systems and key life support systems. In addition technology will be developed for in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) mining and production of LOX/LH2 propellants, in-space propellant storage and transfer for lowering space transportatio n costs and safety risks. Phase 2 will test a human tended LOX/LH2 ISRU pilot plant and demonstrate routine lunar polar access to the lunar poles with the technologies developed in Phase 1. In order to evolve to Phase 3, technology development is required for reusable rocket propulsion for routine access to the surface and for delivering LOX/LH2 propellant to a depot in L2 with a reusable lunar module. In addition, an ISRU mining and production plant is developed for delivery and startup in Phase 3. Thus in Phase 3, LOX/LH2 is produced and delivered to L2 with a reusable lunar module and is being tended by a crew of 4 in a permanent lunar outpost. Although not studied, a similar evolvable Mars architecture can make use of space proven transportation, habitat, and ISRU systems and technology. Thus the next step of Mars human exploration requires the development of human and electronic radiation protection and entry/descent/landing of cargo and crew. At each phase, we use to the maximum extent existing systems and proven technologies as shown in Figure T-1. For new systems and technology, a measured approach was used focused technology development, technology demonstrations, small scale pilot systems, full-scale systems development, and in-space systems testing to mitigate the initial risks to the crew and maximize mission success for each phase. High risk technologies and system demonstrations incorporate a number of planned failures, evolution development, and/or alternate strategies. Thus, each technology demonstration, system test, and phase completion milestone represents a key decision point in the program for continuation with risk, replan with reinvestment, or cancellation. Figure T-1. Program Integration of Technology, Development, and Missions
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture Analysis Methods For the design and analysis of the space system architecture, various analysis methods were used. Because of the limited resources and time for this study, literature search provided much of the fundamental data and where appropriate conceptual design tools were used for vehicle sizing and geometry design. Space system performance, deltaV, was defined for each leg of the space transfer as shown in Figure T-2. For Earth-moon transfer, the deltaV is taken the maximum actually used for the seven Apollo moon missionsviii. However, for the Apollo descent trajectory, there was a flight path angle hold for the pilot to view the landing site for large boulders or small craters (7% penalty); and for the final approach, there were six hover maneuvers for pilot attitude and speed corrections. In addition, there were additional contingencies for engine-valve malfunction, redline low-level propellant sensor, and redesignation to another site (9% penalty). In this study, it was assumed that the landing sites are fully defined, advanced laser sensors for remote site debris and crater checkout, and modern propellant and engine sensors for measuring and establishing final engine performance. In addition, the final descent time was reduced from the 45 seconds baselined in Apollo to 30 seconds at a decent velocity of 0.1 m/s. For polar lunar missions, the cis-lunar performance was taken from NASAs Exploration Systems Architecture Study that provided the baseline systems for NASAs Constellation programix. The performances of transfers from Earth to Earth-moon L2 and from there to Mars orbit were taken from various referencesx, xi, xii, xiii. The selected data are for direct missions only. Performance can be optimized for specific dates of transfer using gravity turns but cannot be used in this study because specific missions and dates are not available. Simple orbital mechanics defined the 1-body orbit around Earth to a periapsis of Earth-moon L2 to compute the periapsis deltaV and the atmospheric entry speed of 11km/s. Finally for all deltaVs in Figure T-2, an additional 5 percent reserve is used. For vehicle sizing and mass, the Georgia Tech Launch Vehicle and Space System Synthesis (LVSSS) was used.xiv This method uses the regression of historical components of space systems for mass properties and sizes the system to meet thrust-to- mass ratio and deltaV constraints. A statistical analysis was performed on the vehicle mass growth history from the initial mass estimate at program start to the final flight mass showing a growth range from 7 percent for families of similar vehicles to 53 percent for the Apollo lunar module. For this study, the mean of this data, 30 percent, was used as the growth factor on the estimated inert mass. The LVSSS mass estimate could be considered conservative because it overestimates the 0.04 inert mass fraction of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle by 35 percent because of the growth margin and the utilization of technology that ranges from 4 decades old to today.
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture ?? Figure T-2. Transfer Performance DeltaV ?? Phase 1A Robotic Scouting, Prospecting, Site Preparation
Paving the Way with Robotics Prior to establishing a commercially-operated ISRU facility and human arrival, various robotic systems would be preparing the way. These robotic systems would take on various tasks and responsibilities to include scouting, prospecting, and initial infrastructure build-up. As NASAs Ranger program and Surveyor program led the way to the manned Apollo program, automated planetary robotic systems will pave the way to lunar human settlement and resource production plants.
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture The strategy on the Moon is to learn how to mine its resources and build up surface infrastructure to permit ever increasing scales of operation.
The Moon: Port of Entry to Cislunar Space, Paul Spudis
Figure T-3. Strategic Approach to Human/Robotic Operations on the Lunar Surface. Parallel technology development and robotic missions prepare base for human arrival
Scouting Scouting is the first stage of resource reconnaissance of a targeted area (second is prospecting). Initially, precursor robotic surface scouting missions will follow present- day orbital assets to get a first-hand look at the surface. While lunar orbital data is important in establishing a large database of information about the lunar surface (topography, estimate of resources, etc.), it is imperative to get ground-truth from robotic surface systems both for resources, terrain and hazard assessment. Methods include ground-truth surface mapping and sampling, core drilling, and geochemical analysis of the water/ice resources. The objectives of this initial phase of operation is to: 1. Identify and prioritize specific sites, through surface operations, that show the best promise for follow-on prospecting. These robotic assets will search for both volatiles/water-ice deposits. This step is essential prior to spending time and energy in prospecting a given site location for water/ice. 2. Identify optimal locations for landing sites and base locations. This would include reconnaissance of areas best suited for locations of: solar power, landing pads, habitation, communications and processing equipment for the lunar volatiles.
Initially, five or more robotics surface assets could be combined in a single launch to scout likely sites on the Moons surface for resources and infrastructure placement. The robotic assets could be a combination of hoppers and lander/rover systems. The
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Evolvable Lunar Architecture hopper technology allows the robotic scout to cover vast ranges by hopping from one potential resource site to another. On the other hand, the land/rover allow a more detailed inspection of probable sites.
Figure T-4. Moving from Earth Reliant to Earth Independent. Technology development required for robotic mobility, drilling and human life support prior to establishing long-term human operations on the Moon.
While we now knowxv there is hydrogen, likely in the form of water, in the cold traps of the lunar polar craters, it is possible that the robotic scouting missions will not discover a source of hydrogen that enables the economical production of cryogenic (LOX/LH2) propellant. While we think this unlikely based on the data from multiple sources of hydrogen at the poles, the consequences would be significant. If this happens, the proposed strategy for lunar development will need to be amended, and the plans for prospecting and mining will need to be delayed and potentially cancelled. We have prioritized this as the number one strategic technical risk among all the identified technical risks (see Technical Risk Assessment on page 28).
Prospecting The second phase of the robotic reconnaissance is analogous to the mining industry where key sites are down-selected from the scouting data for more intense resource prospecting. Prospecting is a much more intensive, organized and targeted form of scouting. This goal of the exploration phase is to: specifically qualify and quantify the lunar water/ice.ala prospecting for gold. This involves assessing the probable resource content both in vertical depth at the surface and also horizontally to ascertain thickness of the ice, physical state and levels of contamination within the water/ice. Robotic probes would perform chemical analysis on the water/ice. Area selection is a critical step of the prospecting phase and designed to find the highest quality of resources (water/ice) as easily, cheaply and quickly as possible. The goal is to define the specific
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